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UP IN THE AIR:
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY V. MACLEAN AND THE
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION
ACT
MIKE BRETT
INTRODUCTION
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sprang into existence
1
almost overnight, growing into the third-largest federal government
2
agency in the United States. Its mission—“to patrol borders, protect
travelers and [] transportation infrastructure, enforce immigration
laws, and respond to disasters and emergencies”—is carried out daily
3
by over 216,000 employees. Despite the gravity of this charge, DHS
employees nonetheless remain subject to the same labor and
employment disputes of any ordinary office or agency. Resolution of
such disputes is messy in the best of environments, and becomes all
the more complicated when national security is at stake. An employee
may have an honest disagreement with management, but what
happens when that disagreement implicates Sensitive Security
Information (SSI) and the potential safety of American civilians?

 J.D. Candidate, Class of 2016, Duke University School of Law. I would like to give special
thanks to Professor Neil Siegel for his advice and guidance on this Commentary.
1. Creation of the Department of Homeland Security, DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC. (Oct. 21,
2014), http://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security.
Executive
Branch,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/our2. The
government/executive-branch (last visited Oct. 30, 2014).
3. Id.
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4

In Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean, the Court will
address whether a federal employee is protected under the
5
Whistleblower Protection Act when that employee speaks out on an
6
issue of national security. The Court’s focus will rest on whether or
not disclosure of SSI is “specifically prohibited by law,” which
crucially hinges on whether agency regulations authorized by
Congressional mandate are themselves “law,” or are merely
administrative rules unenforceable for purposes of the Whistleblower
7
Protection Act.
The Court will address two questions. First, may the phrase
“specifically prohibited by law” be interpreted to include agency rules
8
and regulations, as in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, or is “law” strictly
limited to Congressional statutes? Second, is the language of the Air
Transportation and Security Act (ATSA) sufficiently specific that an
employee’s disclosure is prohibited by virtue of the statute itself,
where Congress gives express authority to the agency to create
9
regulations promulgating the statute? This commentary will cover the
factual and legal background of the case, and provide analysis of how
the Court may consider the primary arguments of both sides.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Underlying Facts
Less than two years after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) learned of a
10
possible plot to hijack United States planes. TSA briefed the Federal
11
Air Marshal Service (FAMS) about this threat in July 2003.

4. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, No. 13-894 (U.S. argued Nov. 4, 2014).
5. 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b)(8) (West 2014).
6. Brief for Petitioner at I, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, No. 13-894 (U.S. July 25,
2014).
7. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 714 F.3d 1301, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 2290 (2014) [hereinafter MacLean IV] (finding “MacLean’s disclosure is not
‘specifically prohibited by law’ within the meaning of the WPA”).
8. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
9. See MacLean IV, 714 F.3d at 1308–10.
10. MacLean v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 116 M.S.P.R. 562, 564 (2011) [hereinafter
MacLean III].
11. Id.
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Later that month, Federal Air Marshal (FAM) Robert J.
12
MacLean
received an order stating all long-distance and
international flights (or “remain overnight” missions) out of Las
13
Vegas were to be cancelled until August 9. Concerned, MacLean
14
approached his supervisor to confirm the directive. It had been sent
via unencrypted text message to his unsecured cell phone, rather than
as an encrypted message to his government-issued personal digital
15
assistant, and it was not specifically labeled SSI. Moreover, the
directive had significant security implications—MacLean believed
cancelling these “remain overnight” missions would put the flying
public in danger, especially in light of the recently discovered
16
hijacking threat. His supervisor confirmed the order, explaining the
agency did not have the budget to conduct such missions at that time
and were temporarily pulling all FAMs from international and long17
distance flights. MacLean, unsatisfied, approached an employee in
the DHS Office of the Inspector General, but his concerns were again
18
rebuffed.
Having failed to effect change from within the organization,
MacLean contacted MSNBC reporter Brock Meeks and revealed the
TSA deployment plan in order to “create a controversy resulting in
19
rescission of the directive.” On July 29, 2003, MSNBC.com published
an article entitled Air Marshals Pulled from Key Flights, which made
public that “[d]espite renewed warnings about possible airline
hijackings, the Transportation Security Administration has alerted
federal air marshals that as of Friday they will no longer be covering
20
cross-country or international flights.” Members of Congress caught
wind of the news story and criticized the TSA deployment plan,
21
ensuring the directive was withdrawn before it ever went into effect.

12. MacLean joined the FAMS in 2001, and at the time of the incident which led to his
removal, he was a federal employee pursuant to 5 U.S.C.A. § 7511(a)(1)(West 2014). Id. (citing
Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, §101, 115 Stat. 597 (2001)).
13. MacLean III, 116 M.S.P.R. at 564, 568.
14. Id. at 565.
15. Id. at 564.
16. Id. at 564–65.
17. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 59a, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, No.
13-894 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2014) (“My supervisor told me that the Service ran out of funds for
overtime, per diem, mileage and lodging.”).
18. MacLean III, 116 M.S.P.R. at 56.
19. Id. at 565.
20. Id. (citing Brock N. Meeks, Air Marshals Pulled from Key Flights, MSNBC (July 29,
2003), http://uslaboragainstwar.org/article.php?id=1429).
21. MacLean III, 116 M.S.P.R. at 565.
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MacLean was not mentioned in the MSNBC article, and
continued serving in the FAMS without notifying anyone of the
22
unauthorized disclosure.
Following the incident, MacLean
determined the FAMS should speak with “a collective voice,” and
became active in the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association
23
(FLEOA).
In 2004, about a year after his initial unauthorized disclosure,
MacLean appeared on NBC Nightly News to criticize the FAMS
dress code, which he believed made air marshals too easily
24
identifiable. Despite appearing on the program disguised as “Air
Marshal Mike,” someone from the TSA recognized MacLean’s voice
25
and reported him. In the ensuing investigation, MacLean admitted
to agents from the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
Office of Professional Responsibility that he was the one who had
26
disclosed the 2003 directive to MSNBC without authorization.
The TSA proposed MacLean’s removal on three grounds: first, his
unauthorized media appearance; second, his unauthorized release of
information to the media; and third, his unauthorized disclosure of
27
SSI. The agency sustained only the third charge and fired MacLean
28
on April 11, 2006. The TSA issued a subsequent order classifying the
29
2003 directive as SSI on August 31, 2006 —over three years after
MacLean made the disclosure, and four months after he was removed.
MacLean appealed his removal through two main avenues. First,
he sought an order that his disclosure did not actually include SSI
30
because the information was not classified as SSI in 2003. Second, he
sought an order that his disclosure was protected under the
31
Whistleblower Protection Act.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 17, at 86a.
MacLean III, 116 M.S.P.R. at 565.
MacLean v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 112 M.S.P.R. 4, 6 (2009) [hereinafter MacLean

II].
29. Id.
30. See MacLean v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 543 F.3d 1145, 1152 (9th Cir. 2008)
[hereinafter MacLean I] (finding the order classifying the 2003 text message as SSI was not a
retroactive agency adjudication).
31. See id. at 1150 (finding the Whistleblower Protection Act did not apply to the order at
issue).
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B. Ninth Circuit Decision
MacLean sought a court order that the TSA could not
32
retroactively classify the 2003 directive as SSI. He petitioned the
33
Ninth Circuit for review of the TSA’s order.
On September 16, 2008, the Ninth Circuit upheld the TSA’s
34
classification and determined that MacLean had indeed leaked SSI.
Under the definition in effect at the time of the directive, SSI
consisted of “specific details of aviation security measures,” including
but not limited to “information concerning specific numbers of
Federal Air Marshals, deployments, or missions, and the methods
35
involved in such operations.” The court found the retroactive
classification by the TSA made no difference, as “information falling
within this designation is automatically considered ‘sensitive security
36
information’ without further action from the TSA.” In other words,
the information in the 2003 directive qualified as SSI whether or not
the TSA explicitly labeled it as such at the time, because it contained
the kind of information automatically understood in the TSA’s
37
regulatory scheme to be SSI. Additionally, the TSA’s classification
did not violate the Whistleblower Protection Act, because it was not a
“personnel action” within the meaning of the Act, but merely an
38
official determination that the 2003 text message contained SSI.
MacLean claimed he did not know the text message was SSI at the
39
time of his disclosure. It was sent as an unencrypted text message to
his cell phone rather than to his secure, government-issued PDA, and

32. See id. at 1152 (discussing the potential retroactivity of the classification as SSI).
33. Id. at 1148.
34. Id. at 1150.
35. Civil Aviation Security Rules, 67 Fed. Reg. 8340, 8352 (Feb. 22, 2002) (codified at 49
C.F.R. pt. 1500 et seq.).
36. See MacLean I, 543 F.3d at 1150 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 1520.7 (2003)).
37. The TSA regulations prohibited unauthorized disclosure of “information concerning
the deployments, numbers, and operations of Coast Guard personnel engaged in maritime
security duties and Federal Air Marshals, to the extent it is not classified national security
information.” 49 C.F.R. § 1520.5(b)(8)(ii) (2003). This “includes, but is not limited to,
information concerning specific numbers of Federal Air Marshals, deployments or missions and
the methods involved in such operations.” 49 C.F.R. § 1520.7(j) (2003). In addition, a “covered
person must disclose, or otherwise provide access to, SSI only to covered persons who have a
need to know, unless otherwise authorized in writing by TSA.” 49 C.F.R. §1520.9(a)(2) (2003).
Finally, “[v]iolation of this part is grounds for a civil penalty and other enforcement or
corrective action by DHS, and appropriate personnel actions for Federal employees.” 49 C.F.R.
§ 1520.17 (2003).
38. MacLean I, 543 F.3d at 1150–51.
39. MacLean IV, 714 F.3d 1301, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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40

was not labeled SSI. However, the court determined MacLean’s plea
of ignorance was not credible in light of his testimony that he
attended an air marshal training in November 2001, during which the
term “sensitive information” was used to describe flight times, flight
41
numbers, and airline information. He confessed that “[i]f I told
somebody that a particular flight was not going to have any
42
protection on it, that endangered that specific flight.” Moreover, he
“admit[ted] that he signed a nondisclosure agreement as a condition
of his employment, which state[d] that Marshals ‘may be removed’ for
‘[u]nauthorized release of security-sensitive or classified
43
information.’” Consequently, the court found MacLean should
reasonably have understood the 2003 directive to be SSI regardless of
whether it was officially classified as such at the time.
Later, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that
whether or not MacLean knew he was disclosing SSI, the regulation
prohibiting disclosure contains no intent element, meaning that
MacLean’s subjective belief that the 2003 directive was not SSI makes
44
no difference in evaluating his culpability. In fact, if his intentions
mattered, it would have made the case against him even stronger:
during the investigation, MacLean admitted:
“[d]ue to the fact my chain of command, the DHS [Inspector
General] and my Congressmen all ignored my complaints and
would not follow up with investigations, I have NO REGRETS or
feel NO REMORSE for going to a credible and responsible media
representative, Brock Meeks. Brock Meeks reporting these gross
mismanagement issues has resulted in immediate and positive
45
change in deadly FAMS policies.”

He further claimed it did not matter to him whether the
information was SSI, and that he would have revealed the
46
information however it was classified. As a result, management lost
47
“all . . . confidence in his ability at that point.”

40. MacLean III, 116 M.S.P.R. 562, 564 (2011).
41. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 17, at 72a.
42. Id. at 74a.
43. MacLean III, 116 M.S.P.R. at 580.
44. Maclean IV, 714 F.3d at 1306 (finding that “because the regulation prohibiting
disclosure of SSI does not include an intent element, Mr. MacLean cannot be exonerated by his
subjective belief that the content of the text message was not SSI”).
45. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 17, at 45a (emphasis in original).
46. Id. at 44a–45a.
47. Id. at 108a.
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C. Merit Systems Protection Board Decision
After failing to demonstrate his disclosure did not contain SSI,
MacLean next challenged his removal on the ground that the
48
Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) protected his disclosure.
Before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), MacLean
claimed the agency could not “take a personnel action” against an
employee for disclosing certain types of information when the
employee “reasonably believe[d]” that the information showed a
“violation of any law, rule or regulation” or “gross mismanagement, a
gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and
49
specific danger to public health or safety.”
The Board never reached the question of whether MacLean
reasonably believed the 2003 directive presented a “substantial and
specific danger” to public safety, because the WPA does not apply if
50
the disclosure is “specifically prohibited by law.” The Board found
his disclosure was indeed “specifically prohibited by law,” as the TSA
had been given express authority by Congress to create regulations
51
prohibiting the release of SSI. As a consequence, the Board rejected
MacLean’s argument, finding his disclosure was not protected under
52
the WPA, and sustained the Agency’s decision to remove him.
MacLean appealed the decision to the United States Court of
53
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

48. MacLean III, 116 M.S.P.R. at 569.
49. The relevant provision of the Act reads in full:
(b) Any employee who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or
approve any personnel action, shall not, with respect to such authority—
(8) take or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take, a personnel action with
respect to any employee or applicant for employment because of—
(A) any disclosure of information by an employee or applicant which the
employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences—
(i) any violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or
(ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority,
or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety, if such
disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law and if such information is
not specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs.
5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(i)–(ii) (West 2014) (emphasis added).
50. MacLean III, 116 M.S.P.R. at 581; see also 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(ii) (West 2014)
(disallowing personnel action for the disclosure of information that evidences a “substantial and
specific danger” to public safety).
51. MacLean III, 116 M.S.P.R. at 581; see 49 U.S.C.A. § 40119(b) (West 2014) (setting out
TSA’s authority to create regulations prohibiting disclosures of security information).
52. MacLean III, 116 M.S.P.R. at 581.
53. MacLean IV, 714 F.3d 1301, 1310–11 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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D. Federal Circuit Decision
Reviewing de novo, the Federal Circuit vacated the Board’s
decision and found MacLean’s disclosure protected under the WPA
because it was not “specifically prohibited by law,” but rather only
54
prohibited by regulation. The Federal Circuit found “[i]n order to
fall under the ‘specifically prohibited by law’ proviso, a ‘disclosure
55
must be prohibited by a statute rather than by a regulation.’”
Discarding the TSA regulations that prohibited disclosure of SSI, the
Federal Circuit focused exclusively on the statutory language of
56
ATSA, ultimately determining the Act was not specific enough to
57
prohibit MacLean’s disclosure of SSI. The Federal Circuit reversed
and remanded for consideration of whether MacLean reasonably
believed the 2003 directive presented a “substantial and specific
danger” to public safety, in which case the WPA would apply,
protecting MacLean’s conduct and blocking DHS from taking
58
personnel action against him.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. History of SSI Disclosure Prohibitions
Beginning in 1974, Congress required the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) to “prescribe regulations prohibiting the
disclosure of information obtained or developed in carrying out
security or research and development activities” if “disclosing the
information would be an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,”
“reveal a trade secret or privileged or confidential commercial or
financial information,” or “be detrimental to the safety of passengers
59
in air transportation.” Pursuant to that mandate, the FAA
promulgated detailed regulations classifying certain information as
60
SSI and restricting disclosure of SSI.

54. Id. at 1310.
55. Id. at 1308.
56. Id.; see also 49 U.S.C.A. § 114(r)(C) (West 2014) (“Notwithstanding section 552 of title
5, the Under Secretary shall prescribe regulations prohibiting the disclosure of information
obtained or developed in carrying out security . . . if the Under Secretary decides that disclosing
the information would . . . be detrimental to the security of transportation.”).
57. MacLean IV, 714 F.3d at 1310.
58. Id.
59. Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745, 1117; Air Transportation
Security Act of 1974 § 316, Pub. L. No. 93-366, 88 Stat. 409, 417.
60. 14 C.F.R. § 191.5 (2000); 14 C.F.R. § 191 (1977).
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The Air Transportation Security Act (ATSA) reassigned that duty
61
to the TSA, and transferred the SSI regulations to TSA’s authority.
Subsequently, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 moved the TSA
62
into the newly created DHS. A separate provision of the Homeland
Security Act expanded on TSA’s statutory mandate to prohibit
63
disclosure of SSI.
B. The Chrysler Default Rule and the Legislative History of the WPA
This case hinges on whether the TSA regulations promulgating
ATSA, 49 U.S.C. § 114(r), can be considered “law” for purposes of the
64
WPA. If they are not, MacLean will be protected from adverse
65
personnel action because of his unauthorized disclosure. To
determine whether Congress intended TSA regulations to function as
66
laws, it is helpful to examine the legislative history. Looking to the
origins of the Act, Congress changed the language in the original draft
from ‘specifically prohibited by law, rule, or regulation’ to just
‘specifically prohibited by law’ in the final version. At first blush, the
removal of “rule, or regulation” appears clearly targeted at excluding
67
these terms from consideration.

61. Aviation and Transportation Security Act § 101(e), Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597,
603 (2001) (codified at scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.A.); see also Civil Aviation Security Rules,
67 Fed. Reg. 8340, 8352 (Feb. 22, 2002).
62. Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 403(2), Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2178.
63. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 1601(b), 49 U.S.C.A. § 114 (West 2014), reads as
follows:
Notwithstanding section 552 of title 5 [the FOIA], the Under Secretary shall prescribe
regulations prohibiting the disclosure of information obtained or developed in
carrying out security under authority of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
(Public Law 107-71) or under chapter 449 of this title if the Under Secretary decides
that disclosing the information would—
(A) be an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(B) reveal a trade secret or privileged or confidential commercial or financial
information; or
(C) be detrimental to the security of transportation.
64. Steve Vladek, Argument Preview: How Much Control do Agencies Have over What
Whistleblowers
May
Disclose,
SCOTUSBLOG,
(Oct.
31,
2014
12:00
PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/10/argument-preview-how-much-control-do-agencies-haveover-what-whistleblowers-may-disclose/.
65. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b)(8) (West 2014) (prohibiting personnel action for disclosing
information that is reasonably believed to, amongst other things, violate law).
66. See FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255, 263 (1975) (stating that where the law is “unclear
and ambiguous” analysis “compel[s] resort to the legislative history”); cf. Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (comparing use of legislative history in statutory
interpretation to “looking over a crowd and picking out your friends”).
67. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).
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In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, however, the Court created a default
68
rule for interpretation of the phrase “by law.” Chrysler interpreted
the phrase “authorized by law” to include not just authorization
conferred directly by statute, but also by “properly promulgated,
69
substantive agency regulations.” Absent a clear showing of contrary
Congressional intent—that is some indication that “by law” includes
only statutes—the phrase “by law” must be read to include both
statutes and regulations. Given the decision in Chrysler predates the
WPA by a decade, had Congress meant to limit the “specifically
prohibited by law” proviso to operate only with statutes and not with
regulations, it would have to make “a clear showing of contrary
70
legislative intent.”
III. ARGUMENTS
A. Petitioner’s Arguments
DHS chiefly contendes “the Federal Circuit’s decision seriously
undermines the effectiveness of the congressionally mandated SSI
regime, invites individual federal employees to make disclosures that
will threaten public safety, and warrants [the Supreme] Court’s
71
immediate review.”
DHS first challenges the Federal Circuit’s finding that TSA
regulations are not “law” for purposes of the WPA proviso,
contending that law within the congressionally created SSI
72
nondisclosure scheme specifically prohibits disclosure of SSI. Citing
the Chrysler default rule for the proposition that “by law” includes
not only statutes, but also “properly promulgated, substantive agency
regulations,” DHS insists Congress meant to include agency
73
regulations within the scope of the WPA proviso. If Congress did not

68. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979).
69. Id. at 295 (propounding a presumption in favor of reading “specifically prohibited by
law” to include both statutes and regulations, absent a contrary indication of Congressional
intent).
70. See id. at 295–96 (“It has been established in a variety of contexts that properly
promulgated, substantive agency regulations have the ‘force and effect of law.’ This doctrine is
so well established that agency regulations implementing federal statutes have been held to preempt state law under the Supremacy Clause. It would therefore take a clear showing of contrary
legislative intent before the phrase ‘authorized by law’ in § 1905 could be held to have a
narrower ambit than the traditional understanding.”).
71. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 17, at 11.
72. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 18.
73. Id. at 19–20.
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desire such a reading of the WPA proviso, DHS argues they should
have made this explicit, and in the absence of contrary legislative
74
intent the default rule in Chrysler applies.
DHS acknowledges the legislative history of the WPA, including
the Senate and House Conference reports that describe the
75
Congressional intent in changing the language of the proviso. DHS
focuses on the fact that Congress ultimately chose the House version,
“by law,” over the more specific Senate version, “by statute,” arguing
this was a deliberate choice evincing Congress’s intent that the
proviso be read generally, in keeping with Chrysler, to include
76
statutes, rules, and regulations.
Furthermore, DHS points out the nondisclosure regulations have
the force and effect of law because they were affirmatively required
77
by Congressional statute. Congress explicitly delegated legislative
authority to TSA to create regulations prohibiting SSI disclosure on
the basis of three distinct criteria: if the information was (1) “an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”; (2) “reveal[ed] a trade
secret or privileged or confidential commercial or financial
information”; or (3) was “detrimental to the safety of passengers in air
78
transportation.” In addition, DHS relies on the fact that Congress
was already aware of the content of TSA’s nondisclosure regulations
79
when it enacted § 114(r)(1). Because Congress passed a law
affirming and expanding TSA’s regulatory authority after TSA’s
regulatory scheme was already in place, DHS contends that Congress
not only acknowledged the legitimacy of TSA’s existing regulations
80
but also affirmatively endowed them with the force of law.
Alternatively, DHS argues that even without counting the TSA
regulations within the scope of “law,” § 114(r)(1) itself specifically
81
prohibits MacLean’s disclosure. For support, they cite Administrator,
82
FAA v. Robertson, where the Court interpreted the phrase
74. Id. at 13.
75. Id. at 26–27.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 21–22.
78. Air Transportation Security Act of 1974 § 316, Pub. L. No. 93-366, 88 Stat. 417.
79. See Homeland Security Act § 1601, 116 Stat. 2312; 67 Fed. Reg. 8340, 8352
(demonstrating Congress’s awareness of the TSA’s nondisclosure regulations).
80. See Ablemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 404, 414 n.8 (1975) (“Congress is
presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt
that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.”).
81. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 28.
82. 422 U.S. 255 (1975).
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83

“specifically exempted from disclosure by statute” to include a
statute authorizing the FAA to exercise broad interest-balancing
discretion in determining whether certain information should be
84
disclosed. DHS argues the phrase “specifically exempted from
disclosure by statute” is even narrower than “specifically prohibited
by law,” but still, the Robertson Court found that the phrase
encompassed an SSI disclosure regulatory scheme that gave broad
85
discretion to the agency. In Robertson, the statute allowed the
agency to classify certain information using a general and untethered
86
interest-balancing approach; here, the statute predicated the
87
agency’s creation of regulations on three enumerated criteria. DHS
argues that if the Court upheld a regulatory scheme in Robertson
broader than the one at issue here, a fortiori the Court must uphold
88
the regulatory scheme here.
Finally, from a policy perspective, DHS warns that allowing
federal employees to publicly disclose SSI would subvert Congress’s
89
intent and create serious risks to public safety. The WPA, DHS
claims, does not allow employees to go to the media whenever they
have a reasonable belief that particular information shows
90
government wrongdoing. Rather, the statutory protection only
applies when the employee raises his or her concerns through
appropriate channels, such as to the Office of the Inspector General
or Office of Special Counsel, thereby allowing the appropriate
officials to inspect an employee’s claims while keeping the SSI
91
secure. DHS argues that if an employee could run to the media any
time he or she had a plausible objection to a directive involving SSI,
the resulting public disclosure would sink Congress’s system for

83. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(3) (West 2014).
84. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 28–31 (citing Robertson, 422 U.S. at 256–58).
85. Id.
86. The statute at issue in Robertson allowed the agency to withhold information
whenever the agency adjudged disclosure was “not required in the interest of the public” and
“would adversely affect the interests” of someone objecting to the disclosure. 422 U.S. at 258 n.4
(quoting 49 U.S.C.A. § 1504 (West 2014)). See also id. at 261–67.
87. See 49 U.S.C.A. § 114(r)(1)(A)–(C) (West 2014); see supra note 78 and accompanying
text.
88. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 30 (“The combination of a broader proviso and a
more specific nondisclosure statute makes this an even easier case for proviso coverage than
Robertson itself.”).
89. Id. at 38–39.
90. Id. at 36 (citing 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b)(8)(B) (West 2014)).
91. Id.
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92

keeping classified information out of the wrong hands. In effect, this
reading of the WPA would allow each of the TSA’s more than 60,000
employees to disclose any information to the media that they
personally determined necessary for the public to know, regardless of
93
the broader implications. Such a result, DHS argues, would not only
contravene Congress’s purpose in creating the regulatory scheme, but
94
would impermissibly compromise national security.
B. Respondent’s Arguments
Respondent MacLean counters that even if TSA regulations
specifically prohibited his disclosure of SSI, they are not “law” and
95
therefore do not apply under the WPA proviso. He insists the agency
cannot rely on its own regulations to remove him for disclosing SSI
because the key sentence of the WPA authorizes whistleblowers to
disclose “any violation of any law, rule, or regulation,” but allows
punishment of such disclosures only if they are “specifically
96
prohibited by law.” The Court has previously held “[a] statute that in
one section refers to ‘law, rule or regulation,’ and in another section to
only ‘laws’ cannot, unless we abandon all pretense at precise
97
communication, be deemed to mean the same thing in both places.”
As a result, MacLean claims the plain language of the WPA proviso
98
clearly excludes regulations.
DHS warns MacLean’s argument threatens the integrity of the
SSI nondisclosure statutory scheme, and MacLean counters that
99
DHS’s argument threatens the integrity of the WPA. MacLean
argues that allowing agencies to use their own regulations to block
disclosure of dangerous or illegal agency practices counteracts the
100
purpose of the WPA. Congress changed the language in an earlier
draft of the statute—“specifically prohibited by law, rule, or
regulation”—to the present version, “specifically prohibited by
law”—because it feared exactly this “adoption of internal procedural
regulations against disclosure, [] thereby enabl[ing] an agency to
92. Id. at 37.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 38–40.
95. Brief for Respondent at 19, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, No. 13-894 (U.S.
Mar. 28, 2014).
96. See id. at 19 (emphasis added).
97. Dep’t of Treasury, I.R.S. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 494 U.S. 922, 932 (1990).
98. Brief for Respondent, supra note 95, at 16.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 22.
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discourage an employee from coming forward with allegations of
101
wrongdoing.”
In addition, MacLean asserts ATSA makes it clear that “nothing
in [§ 114(r)], or any other provision of law, shall be construed to
authorize the designation of information as sensitive security
information” in order to “conceal a violation of law, inefficiency, or
administrative error” or “prevent embarrassment to a person,
102
organization, or agency.” The concern at the forefront of Congress’s
mind was that by allowing the agency to decide for itself what
information was SSI, the agency might classify information to cover
103
up wrongdoing. MacLean contends this is exactly what happened in
his case, and exactly the reason the WPA exists—to allow employees
to come forward with legitimate claims of misfeasance without fear of
104
reprisal, even when those claims involve disclosure of SSI.
Thus, from a policy standpoint, MacLean warns that including
regulations to be within the ambit of “specifically prohibited by law”
runs the risk of stifling whistleblowers and perpetuating undesirable
internal conduct, including “violation[s] of law, inefficienc[ies], or
105
administrative error[s.]” MacLean argues this result could not have
106
been the intent of Congress in passing the statute.
MacLean next turns to DHS’s argument that even without TSA’s
regulatory prohibitions, the statute itself specifically prohibits his
disclosure. MacLean counters that § 114(r) does not prohibit anything
at all—it merely “allows DHS ‘to prescribe regulations prohibiting the
107
disclosure of information.’”
Even if it were a prohibition, MacLean argues, ATSA’s broad
authorization for the TSA to shield information is not specific enough
108
to meet the demands of the WPA proviso. He compares § 114(r) to
a provision of the Trade Secrets Act, which in great detail prohibits
101. S. REP. NO. 95-969, at 19 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.S.C.A.N. 2723, 2743.
102. 49 U.S.C.A. § 114(r)(4)(A)–(D) (West 2014); see American Communities’ Right to
Public Information Act § 561(c)(1), Pub. L. No. 111-83, 123 Stat. 2182 (2009); see also 49
U.S.C.A. § 40119(b) (West 2014) (illustrating similar limitations on the Department of
Transportation’s authority).
103. Brief for Respondent, supra note 95, at 22.
104. Id. (“The ‘purpose of the WPA’ is to allow employees to make [] disclosures ‘without
fearing retaliatory action by their supervisors or those who might be harmed by the
disclosures.’”) (citing Willis v. Dep’t of Agric., 141 F.3d 1139, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
105. 49 U.S.C.A. § 114(r)(4)(A).
106. Brief for Respondent, supra note 95, at 7–8.
107. Id. at 17.
108. Id.
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disclosure of “information concern[ing] or related to the trade secrets,
processes, operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity,
confidential statistical data, amount or source of any income, profits,
losses, or expenditures of any person, firm, partnership, corporation,
109
or association . . . .” By contrast, § 114(r) lists no such categories, but
prohibits only generally the disclosure of information that may “be
110
detrimental to the security of transportation.”
MacLean asserts the WPA strikes a balance between the benefit
of allowing whistleblowers to reveal agency wrongdoing on the one
hand, and the need to keep certain information secret for national
111
security purposes on the other. But MacLean contends DHS may
not decide where this balance lies; only Congress can, because in the
plain language of the WPA, Congress chose not to delegate that
112
power to the agency. As a result, he argues, DHS may not prohibit
his disclosure and consequently has no grounds to take personnel
action against him for blowing the whistle.
IV. ANALYSIS
Assuming MacLean “reasonably believe[d]” he was revealing an
FAMS deployment plan which would cause a “substantial and specific
danger to public safety,” he will be protected under the WPA unless
113
his disclosure was “specifically prohibited by law.” His disclosure
was indeed “specifically prohibited,” but not by statute—only by the
114
agency regulation promulgating the statute. If the Court determines
these regulations are “law” then MacLean’s removal will be sustained.
If, however, the Court determines only “statutory law and court
115
interpretations of those statutes” may be considered law for
purposes of the WPA, MacLean’s disclosure will be protected. In light
of the clear showing of Congressional intent evident from the
statutory history, the latter ruling appears the more probable.
109. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1905 (West 2014).
110. 49 U.S.C.A. § 114(r)(1)(C) (West 2014).
111. Brief for Respondent, supra note 95, at 47.
112. Id. at 18.
113. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (West 2014); see also MacLean IV, 714 F.3d 1301, 1311
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (Wallach, J., concurring) (“[T]he facts alleged, if proven, allege conduct at the
core of the Whistleblower Protection Act.”).
114. See MacLean IV, 714 F.3d at 1309 (“[T]he ultimate source of prohibition of Mr.
MacLean’s disclosure is not a statute but a regulation, which the parties agree cannot be ‘law
under the WPA.’”).
115. 56 M.S.P.R. 536, 542–43 (M.S.P.B. 1993) (citing H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 95-1717, at 4
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2864).
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It bears noting that at the time of his disclosure, MacLean was a
first-time offender with a spotless record, and appears to have acted
116
out of genuine concern for the public safety. He stood to gain
nothing from his disclosure, and in this sense his circumstances are
quite different from other FAMs who have been disciplined by TSA
117
for disclosing SSI. His case falls squarely under the scenario
118
envisioned by the WPA.
Nevertheless, DHS’s policy arguments are compelling. National
security interests, which involve the safety of society at large, will
generally outweigh the interest of the individual no matter how well119
intentioned. MacLean acted unilaterally and contrary to explicit
agency regulations in approaching the media, and according to TSA
Officer in Charge Frank Donzanti, he did so without “all the
information. He’s not in a position to make that kind of decision.
There [were] other factors that [went] into [the 2003 directive] he
120
His decision thus created an immediate
[was] unaware of.”
vulnerability in the security network managed by the TSA, forcing the
121
agency to reallocate scarce resources to cover a security gap. From
an interest-balancing standpoint, the benefit of MacLean’s disclosure
is almost certainly outweighed by the agency’s interest in maintaining
122
effective national security policies.
Powerful as the policy arguments are, however, the question is
ultimately one of statutory interpretation. Congress’s intent in passing
the WPA will control the outcome of the case. In the process of going
from “by law, rule, or regulation” to simply “by law,” each chamber of
Congress approved a different version of the statute: the House
123
passed a version that read, “specifically prohibited by law,” while the
Senate passed a version that read, “specifically prohibited by
124
statute.” The House version, “by law,” was ultimately chosen and
116. MacLean IV, 714 F.3d at 1306.
117. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 17, at 106a–08a.
118. MacLean IV, 714 F.3d at 1311 (Wallach, J., concurring) (“[T]he facts alleged, if proven,
allege conduct at the core of the Whistleblower Protection Act.”).
119. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“Pressing public
necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions.”)
120. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 17, at 104a.
121. See MacLean IV, 714 F.3d at 1306 (“[B]ecause even a possibility that a Marshal may be
onboard is an important deterrent to terrorist activity, Mr. MacLean’s disclosure compromised
flight safety and forced the Agency to reallocate resources to address this new vulnerability.”).
122. See,
e.g.,
National
Security:
Overview,
RIGHT2INFO.ORG,
http://www.right2info.org/exceptions-to-access/national-security (last visited Nov. 15, 2014).
123. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 95-1717, at 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2864.
124. S. REP. NO. 95-969, at 19 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.S.C.A.N. 2723, 2743.
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125

remains on the books today.
This legislative history suggests two mutually exclusive
possibilities. First, by choosing the House version over the Senate
version and substituting the more general term “law” for the more
precise term “statute,” Congress meant to include rules and
regulations as “laws” within the meaning of the WPA proviso. Or,
second, by reducing the original language from “by law, rule, or
regulation” to simply “by law,” Congress intended to limit the proviso
to include only statutory law.
If Congress meant to include rules and regulations in the WPA
proviso, it could have left the statutory language of the original draft
126
intact. The phrase “law, rule, or regulation” appears more than
127
twenty times elsewhere in the WPA, seven times in § 2302(b) alone,
128
and even in the same sentence as the proviso in question. It would
not make sense for Congress to use the phrase “by law, rule or
regulation” throughout if it understood “by law” to have the same
meaning. After all, “[a] statute that in one section refers to ‘law, rule
or regulation,’ and in another section to only ‘laws’ cannot, unless we
abandon all pretense at precise communication, be deemed to mean
129
the same thing in both places.”
Chrysler created a presumption that the phrase “by law” includes
rules and regulations, but “a clear showing of contrary legislative
130
intent” may rebut this presumption. Here, the Senate and House
Conference reports provide the “clear showing” needed. The Senate
report reveals Congress’s concern that the original “by law, rule, or
regulation” language “would encourage the adoption of internal
procedural regulations against disclosure, and thereby enable an
agency to discourage an employee from coming forward with
131
allegations of wrongdoing.” The Senate chose the statutory language
it did to eliminate the exact kind of conduct at play in MacLean—the
removal of an employee for whistle-blowing despite adverse agency

125. 49 U.S.C.A. § 114(r) (West 2014).
126. See S. REP. NO. 95-969, at 21 (1978); H.R. REP. NO. 95-1403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978).
127. See 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 2302(b)(1)(E), (6), (8)(A)(i), (8)(B)(i), (9)(A), (12), (13) (West
2014).
128. The WPA protects a disclosure “of any violation of any law, rule or regulation . . . if
such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law.” 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (West 2014).
129. Dep’t of Treasury, I.R.S. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 494 U.S. 922, 932 (1990).
130. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 296 (1979).
131. S. REP. NO. 95-969, at 19 (1978).
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regulations designed to keep him quiet. The Senate Report thereby
satisfies the exception to the default rule of Chrysler.
However, Congress ultimately chose to enact the House version
and not the Senate version of the bill, limiting the value of the Senate
report. Thankfully, the House Conference report provides an equally
“clear showing of contrary legislative intent,” stating flatly that
“prohibited by law” refers to “statutory law and court interpretations
133
of those statutes . . . not . . . to agency rules and regulations.” From
this, it seems obvious that Congress did not intend “by law” to include
134
regulations for purposes of the WPA, but only statutory law.
Thus, the regulations prohibiting disclosure of SSI are irrelevant
for purposes of determining whether the WPA protects MacLean’s
conduct, and only the statutory language of ATSA itself may
specifically prohibit the disclosure in such a way that the WPA will
135
not apply.
136
In Kent v. General Services Administration, the Merit Systems
Protection Board addressed the WPA proviso at issue here in the
137
context of the Trade Secrets Act. The Board held that the Act
specifically prohibited disclosure by law and not by regulation,
because the Act used extremely detailed and comprehensive
descriptions of the prohibitions and penalties for public disclosure of
138
information.
For example, the Act prohibits disclosure of
“information concern[ing] or related to the trade secrets, processes,
operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential
statistical data, amount or source of any income, profits, losses, or
expenditures of any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or
139
association . . . .”
ATSA, by contrast, broadly prohibits disclosure of information
140
“detrimental to security of transportation.” It lists no specific
categories, only general criteria, and it “gives some discretion to the
141
Agency to fashion regulations for prohibiting disclosure.” ATSA
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See id.
H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 95-1717, at 4 (1978).
See id.
MacLean IV, 714 F.3d 1301, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
56 M.S.P.R. 536 (M.S.P.B. 1993).
18 U.S.C.A. § 1905 (West 2014).
56 M.S.P.R. at 543–46.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1905 (West 2014).
49 U.S.C.A. § 114(r) (West 2014).
MacLean IV, 714 F.3d 1301, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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therefore seems too general to “specifically prohibit” the conduct in
question on its own, particularly compared against the specificity of
the Trade Secrets Act.
Still, ATSA specifically charges the Secretary of Transportation
142
with prescribing regulations pursuant to certain criteria. The
distinction is a fine one. ATSA does not fall squarely under the WPA
proviso, but also does not delegate authority to the agency without
143
circumscribing agency discretion in any way. The statute falls in a
gray area. It does not specifically prohibit disclosure by law, but it
does prescribe criteria that the agency is obligated to use in creating
144
regulations specifically prohibiting disclosure.
Difficult as it is to nail down ATSA’s specificity for purposes of
the WPA, analysis of the motivation behind ATSA’s enactment may
prove helpful. ATSA was not primarily intended to prevent employee
disclosure of sensitive information; rather, it was meant to empower
DHS to reject the public’s requests for confidential intelligence,
145
notwithstanding the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). In the
hands of the general public, sensitive security information could be
used towards any variety of undesirable ends contrary to national
146
security objectives. ATSA was designed as a privacy shield to limit
the potential impact of the FOIA on national security by forbidding
private citizens from asking for certain information—not by
forbidding public employees from disclosing it in the right
147
circumstances.
Section 114(r) does not specifically prohibit the disclosure of
148
SSI. Compared side-by-side with a statute like the Trade Secrets
Act, which does prohibit disclosure of SSI, § 114(r) falls short of the
149
mark set by the WPA and Kent. “[W]hen Congress seeks to prohibit

142. 49 U.S.C.A. § 114(r) (West 2014).
143. Maclean IV, 714 F.3d at 1309.
144. See Air Transportation Security Act of 1974, supra note 76.
145. See Public Citizen, Inc. v. FAA, 988 F.2d 186, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (rejecting the
argument that by expressly including the phrase “[n]otwithstanding section 552 of Title 5
relating to freedom of information,” Congress intended the statute “not to shield information
from disclosure under any statute other than FOIA”).
146. See generally Dallas Boyd, Protecting Sensitive Information: The Virtue of SelfRestraint, 7 HOMELAND SEC. AFF. J., MAY 2011, available at http://www.hsaj.org/
?download&mode=dl&h&w&drm=resources%2Fvolume7%2Fissue1%2Fpdfs%2F&f=7.1.10.p
df&altf=7.1.10.pdf.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See 56 M.S.P.R. 536, 543–46 (M.S.P.D. 1993).
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disclosure of specific types of information, it has the ability to draft
150
the statute accordingly.” Congress did not do so here. Instead,
Congress made an intentional choice in drafting ATSA the way it did:
rather than codify prohibitions on disclosure of SSI in a statute, it
gave the TSA broad discretion to create regulations that prohibit
151
disclosure of SSI. The distinction is a crucial one, precisely because
of provisos like the one at issue in the WPA.
In conjunction with the language of the WPA proviso, § 114(r)
may be read as a deliberate choice by Congress to leave the door
open for whistleblowers to disclose SSI exactly as MacLean did. In
fact, when Congress discovered the deployment plan then being used
by TSA, multiple members objected to the plan and created a
national controversy that resulted in the withdrawal of the 2003
152
directive. Under this reading, the statutory scheme functioned
exactly as designed, stopping the agency from using self-serving
regulations to hide information from Congress and prevent exposure
153
of an embarrassing internal agency mistake.
Because ATSA does not meet the “specifically prohibited by law”
standard demanded by the WPA, no “law” specifically prohibited
154
MacLean’s disclosure. Consequently, the Court will likely uphold
the decision of the Federal Circuit in favor of MacLean.
CONCLUSION
The Court’s decision will hinge on the statutory language of the
WPA proviso itself and the legislative intent behind the textual
changes to the WPA revealed in the Senate and House Conference
reports. Both of these point to the conclusion that Congress meant to
exclude rules and regulations from the “specifically prohibited by
law” proviso. Thus, despite the strong national security interest in
placing the confidentiality of SSI above the determination by an
employee that he or she should disclose potentially dangerous
information, the Court will likely affirm the Federal Circuit’s finding
that MacLean’s disclosure was not prohibited by law, and remand for
a determination of whether he reasonably believed there was a
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. As MacLean
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

MacLean IV, 714 F.3d 1301, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
49 U.S.C.A. § 114(r) (West 2014).
MacLean IV, 714 F.3d at 1304.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 95, at 19.
MacLean IV, 714 F.3d at 1310.
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was a first-time offender with a clean record, who acted out of public
concern, and gained no individual benefit from his disclosure, it seems
probable that on remand the court will find him protected by the
WPA.

